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A risk assessment tool for resumption of
research activities during the COVID-19
pandemic for field trials in low resource
settings
Suzanne M. Simkovich1,2,3* , Lisa M. Thompson4, Maggie L. Clark5, Kalpana Balakrishnan6, Alejandra Bussalleu7,8,
William Checkley1,2, Thomas Clasen9, Victor G. Davila-Roman10, Anaite Diaz-Artiga11, Ephrem Dusabimana12,
Lisa de las Fuentes10, Steven Harvey2,13, Miles A. Kirby14, Amy Lovvorn9, Eric D. McCollum15, Erick E. Mollinedo16,
Jennifer L. Peel5, Ashlinn Quinn17, Ghislaine Rosa18, Lindsay J. Underhill1,2, Kendra N. Williams1,2, Bonnie N. Young5,
Joshua Rosenthal17 and HAPIN Investigators

Abstract
Rationale: The spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 has suspended many non-COVID-19
related research activities. Where restarting research activities is permitted, investigators need to evaluate the risks
and benefits of resuming data collection and adapt procedures to minimize risk.
Objectives: In the context of the multicountry Household Air Pollution Intervention (HAPIN) trial conducted in rural,
low-resource settings, we developed a framework to assess the risk of each trial activity and to guide protective
measures. Our goal is to maximize the integrity of reseach aims while minimizing infection risk based on the latest
scientific understanding of the virus.
Methods: We drew on a combination of expert consultations, risk assessment frameworks, institutional guidance
and literature to develop our framework. We then systematically graded clinical, behavioral, laboratory and field
environmental health research activities in four countries for both adult and child subjects using this framework.
National and local government recommendations provided the minimum safety guidelines for our work.
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page)

Results: Our framework assesses risk based on staff proximity to the participant, exposure time between staff and
participants, and potential viral aerosolization while performing the activity. For each activity, one of four risk levels,
from minimal to unacceptable, is assigned and guidance on protective measures is provided. Those activities that
can potentially aerosolize the virus are deemed the highest risk.
Conclusions: By applying a systematic, procedure-specific approach to risk assessment for each trial activity, we were
able to protect our participants and research team and to uphold our ability to deliver on the research commitments
we have made to our staff, participants, local communities, and funders. This framework can be tailored to other
research studies conducted in similar settings during the current pandemic, as well as potential future outbreaks with
similar transmission dynamics.
The trial is registered with clinicaltrials.gov NCT02944682 on October 26. 2016 .
Keywords: Risk assessment, Biosafety, Research, COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2

Background
The spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) and resulting coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has led to the temporary suspension
of many non-COVID-19 related research activities worldwide. Where feasible, studies are considering remote data
collection by telephone or web-based conferencing [1–3].
However, this approach is often not possible when performing anthropometric measurements, specimen collection, or
when investigators need to make other direct observations.
Even temporary suspension of research activities can potentially cause harm if investigators are evaluating an intervention that is hypothesized to be beneficial. Further, the
suspension of data collection could result in loss of study
power and potentially introduce bias. Every day, we are gaining a greater understanding of the transmissibility of SARSCoV-2, and this knowledge increases our ability to safely resume a wide variety of non-COVID-19 related research activities [3, 4]. Where local law or institutional regulations
permit activities to restart, investigators need to evaluate the
risks and benefits to both research staff and participants of
resuming data collection. To safely conduct study activities,
researchers need to develop standardized procedures that are
based on realistic assessment of these risks, provide guidance
on where and when they are manageable, as well as how to
minimize the risk with physical distance measures and appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE).
Investigators in the Household Air Pollution Intervention Network (HAPIN) trial initially suspended data collection due to the pandemic in March 2020 and have
since restarted collection of behavioural, environmental,
biological and clinical measurements during the fifth
year of a five-year, multi-country trial [5–8]. HAPIN is a
randomized controlled trial in rural areas of Guatemala,
India, Peru, and Rwanda that is assessing the health benefits of providing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) stoves
and an 18-month supply of free LPG to 3200 households
that otherwise depend on solid biomass fuel (wood, animal dung, or crop residue) for cooking. Measurements

of cooking behavior, personal and in-home exposure to
air pollution, biological samples and clinical measurements are being collected longitudinally from pregnant
women and their newborns in every household, along
with an older, non-pregnant adult woman, if she resides
in the house [5–8]. Our study involves home visits, as
well as visits to health centers and hospitals during the
woman’s pregnancy and the first year of the child’s life.
As SARS-CoV-2 spread globally, governments in all four
countries implemented public safety restrictions that limited activities to those designated as essential. Essential activities varied across settings and during the initial period
of restrictions. Research activities were not considered essential. However, LPG delivery for cooking was considered
essential in all four countries. In Guatemala and Rwanda,
our research teams were permitted to continue delivering
LPG to study households without disruption. In India, the
gas companies continued to deliver refill tanks to study
participants. In Peru, our team was limited in its ability to
deliver gas during the initial weeks of the restrictions, but
we were later able to re-establish services with a local gas
company for delivery.
With permission to continue delivery of the LPG
intervention, we immediately implemented changes in
our delivery protocols to minimize SARS-CoV-2 risk.
Further, in anticipation of the additional easement of
movement restrictions in countries around the world,
we reviewed the literature for guidance on strategies researchers have used for assessing the risk of activities
during COVID-19 or other pandemics, and found a
dearth of available guidance. Perhaps the most relevant
existing framework is that proposed by Lumeng and colleagues, which was designed for research focused in clinical settings in the U.S.A. Thus, we developed a risk
assessment tool with the guiding principle of ethical research to minimize the potential risks to research staff,
participants and rural communities participating in the
HAPIN trial research settings. We wanted our risk assessment tool to allow researchers to assess the risk of
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each study activity utilizing the same general criteria to
support management decisions across this large multinational, multi-disciplinary study with both competing
and complementary activities. Although our risk assessment tool has been designed within the framework of
specific activities of the HAPIN trial, we report here on
our approach, which can be applied to other research
contexts and questions in similar settings.

reported, we assumed that any staff member, collaborator or community participant might be shedding
the virus. Small children (especially infants) appear to
be infected at the same rate as adults, but have more
mild disease and thus may be unknowingly spreading
disease. We agreed that viral transmissibility and the
true prevalence of COVID-19 are not clearly known
in any of our study sites due to limited testing. We
also note that recent seroprevalence studies have reported that case burdens are likely underreported. As
such, we chose to err on the side of caution and assume moderate to substantial incidence of disease in
all our settings. Therefore, risk was defined as largescale, uncontrolled community transmission. When
widespread vaccination has been achieved in our settings and/or when there are other indications of
lower prevalence of disease in our sites, we may adjust our risk levels accordingly.
We assessed each HAPIN data collection activity
among each group of participants (pregnant woman
/new mother, infant, or non-pregnant older adult
woman) because the risks may vary with each participant
group. Data collection activities were graded and agreed
upon by our team of scientists. Local site investigators
were asked to report perceived concerns by staff and
participants in their communities. Risk factors and definitions were presented to the HAPIN steering committee, which met weekly, for feedback before adoption.
Even with adoption by the steering committee, if local
community risk factors at the sites did not allow continued trial activities, the activity was stopped until safety
could be ensured. Standard Operating Procedures were
developed for the resumption of study activities and included guidance on screening staff and participants for
Covid-19 symptoms, transporting staff in project vehicles, cleaning equipment and surfaces, conducting home
visits and health facility survelliance, and quarantining
for suspected exposures to the virus. These documents
are reviewed monthly by two assigned investigators on
the trial to reflect they reflect the most up to date knowledge of transmission dynamics and local risk.

Simkovich et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology

Methods
In developing our risk assessment tool, we drew on a
combination of expert consultations, government regulations, national and local expertise, institutional guidance
and review of emerging literature. We queried our
multi-national panel of investigators and field team
leaders from across the trial with expertise in the disciplines of clinical medicine and imaging, nursing, environmental science, epidemiology, behavioral science,
community engagement and statistics, along with the
trial funders who provide scientific guidance to the
HAPIN trial. We sought input from local community
leaders, the Ministries of Health, universities and nongovernmental organizations regarding appropriate operations and safety concerns. We consulted with the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and Data and Safety
Monitoring Board (DSMB) presiding over the trial regarding resumption of activities. We drew upon historical occupational health frameworks for infectious
disease biosafety and risk assessment and the most recent peer-reviewed and grey literature about infection
dynamics. We also considered staff experience. Using all
of these inputs, we built a framework to evaluate risk of
exposure to SARS-CoV-2 [3]. Our intent was to develop
criteria that were clear, simple and actionable for field
managers and staff to implement, and to recommend appropriate practices and materials, in accordance with the
risk level of each procedure and perceived risk
threshold.
While SARS-CoV2 research findings are still emerging,
our assessment is based on the consensus that aerosolization and droplet carriage of virus, primarily from
coughing, sneezing, singing, crying, talking, are the predominant modes of infection. It is unclear how long the
virus remains in the air. Fomites from surface contact
may also contribute to transmission, but are likely a
smaller risk. Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 presence has been
detected in urine, stool, breast milk, semen and blood,
but we are not aware of documented transmission
through these bodily fluids at the time of this publication. Furthermore, the risk of transmission is greatest
in the two days preceding onset of symptoms and
continues afterward for at least ten days, and up to
twenty days in immunosuppressed patients. Because
documented asymptomatic carriage has been widely

Results
Evaluation of risk criteria for each procedure included
the age of participant, location, required physical proximity, exposure time, aerosolization potential, and criteria for use of PPE (Table 1). Using these criteria we
established a four level schedule that ranged from minimal to unacceptably high risk (Table 2). We then proceeded to assess each research activity according to the
criteria outlined in Table 1 and assigned a risk level and
appropriate PPE to each of these. We assessed research
activities that included LPG fuel delivery, administration
of tablet-based surveys (e.g. questionnaires asked of
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Table 1 Risk Assessment Framework
Risks

Definitions

Example 1- Lung
Ultrasound
Obtainment

Example 2Personal
Exposure
Assessment

Participant

Participant group (e.g. pregnant woman/new mother, child, older adult woman)

Child

Older Adult
Woman,
Pregnant
Woman

Location

Place where sample is collected or procedure performed

Healthcare facility

Home (indoor
or outdoor)

Close

Close

Proximity to
Close: The procedure requires the field worker and participant to be closer than 2 m (6 ft) of
the participant one another. If a procedure produces aerosolization, then it is automatically considered close
contact.
Socially distant: The procedure to be performed allows the field worker and participant to
maintain a distance of > 2 m (6 ft) apart from one another.

Exposure time Short: The procedure can be performed without the staff and participant in close proximity for Prolonged
> 15 min.
Prolonged: The procedure requires the field worker and participant to be in close proximity for
> 15 min.

Setup: short to
prolonged
Take-down:
short

Aerosolization
Potential

None: The procedure is unlikely to produce any aerosolized particles.
Yes: The procedure may produce aerosolized particles.

Yes

None

Personal
Protective
Equipment
(PPE) Needs

Criteria to determine PPE

PPE Needs

Participant and staff are not in close contact at
anytime. No aerosolizing procedures. No
processing of biologic samples.

Paper or cloth facemask.

N95 or equivalent
respirator + eye
protection + gown
+ gloves

Paper
facemask +
eye protection
+ gloves

Participant and staff may be in close contact
but only for a short period of time. Biologic
materials may be processed in the lab. No
aerosolizing procedures performed.

Paper facemask (preferably procedural
quality) + eye protection + gloves (if the
procedure requires touching the participant
and/or a clinical specimen is collected.

Participant and staff may be in close contact
for a prolonged period of time and/or an
aerosolizing procedure is occuring

N95 or equivalent respirator + eye
protection + gown + gloves.

Participant and staff may be in close contact
Procedure will not be performed.
for a prolonged period of time and/or an
aerosolizing procedure is occuring in a manner
that staff and participants can not be safely
protected.

Table 2 Semi-quantitative risk schedule
Scale Descriptor

Definition

Example (see Additional file 1 for full descriptions)

Level
1

Minimal Risk

Participant and staff are not in close contact indoors at
anytime. No aerosolizing procedures. No processing of
biologic samples.

Data collection by phone, in-person survey administration
outdoors, LPG fuel delivery

Level
2

Moderate Risk Participant and staff may be in close contact but only for a
short period of time. Biologic materials may be processed in
the lab. No aerosolizing procedures performed.

Brachial artery reactivity testing, carotid artery reactivity
testing, blood pressure measurement, fetal ultrasound,
personal exposure assessment in adults, blood collection in
adults, urine collection in adults

Level
3

High Risk

Participant and staff may be in close contact for a prolonged
period of time or an aerosolizing procedure is occuring (e.g.
child crying during length measurement)

Anthropometry, collection of blood in children, screening
children for pneumonia, lung ultrasound, buccal scrape,
nasal brush

Level
4

Unacceptable
Risk for
Research

Participant and staff may be in close contact with patient
samples for a prolonged period of time and an aerosolizing
procedure is occuring in a manner that staff and participants
can not be safely protected.

No HAPIN procedures were deemed Level 4; however, the
following procedures would be deemed Level 4 in our
framework: bronchoscopy, induced sputum,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
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mothers about their children’s health), data downloads
from environmental monitors, personal exposure assessment to household air pollution, biological sample collection (e.g. urine, nasal swabs, venous blood) and lab
processing of biological samples in the field laboratories,
clinical measures (e.g. newborn birth weight, lung ultrasound, blood pressure), observations in homes of pregnant women/new mothers, children, and vascular
procedures in adults (Additional file 1).
Protective measures available in our settings were: a)
where feasible, data collection was completed by telephone; b) where possible, face-to-face activities were
conducted outside; c) when inside homes, clinics or offices, staff and participants minimized the number of
people in the room; d) rigourous hygiene for staff, materials, equipment and surfaces were employed at all times;
e) appropriate PPE was used based on the context and
activity; f) under very high risk conditions, the visit or
the procedure was suspended.
Using this assessment and taking necessary measures
for protection, almost all of our research activities were
deemed to pose potentially manageable risks. Biological
sample collection spanned a range of assigned risk due
to differences in participant-staff interaction. The activities with the highest level of risk were those that potentially aerosolize the virus during the procedure. For
example, urine collection requires minimal contact (i.e.,
field workers instruct the participant to collect and store
the urine sample until it can be retreived) resulting in
low risk to both the participant and the study staff.
However, dried blood spot collection from capillary
blood draws from infants (who are unable to wear a
mask and often cry during the procedure) could feasibly
put field workers at high risk (examples of two procedures are provided in Table 1; all procedures are described in the Additional file 1). To illustrate Level 4
activities, we identified several activities that were not
part of our protocol, but that could pose unmanageable
risks (e.g. bronchoscopy, sputum inducting procedures,
cardiopulmonary resusitation) for routine research in
the pandemic context (Table 2).

related to the primary aims of a trial weighed against the
associated risk of performing the research activity. Obviously, local health regulations related to mobility, home
or clinic visits by researchers supersede any of these
judgments.
The framework offers a way to systematically evaluate
diverse research activities involving different disciplines
using the same basic criteria and a scoring system to
compare associated risk for a given procedure. It also
provides clear guidance for field teams on the appropriate PPE and practices in the context of limited resource
environments, and thus appropriately utilizes limited
PPE where it may be scarce and expensive. Despite these
strengths, there are limitations. Our framework does not
make recommendations on whether or not to continue
an activity – e.g. through an explict cost-benefit algorithm. Decisions on what research should be continued
in the presence of risk also require a careful assessment
of benefits. We chose to make the risk-benefit calculation and decisions regarding which activities to suspend
an independent process from assessment of risk. In our
context, an efficacy trial, we are in equipoise regarding
the potential benefits of the intervention to participants.
Thus, analysis of benefits can only be honestly assessed
in terms of the potential benefit of a given activity to the
integrity of the trial, not to trial participants as maybe
the case for other kinds of clinical research. Among the
criteria we used to examine potential benefits of risk in
the HAPIN trial were whether or not the aim of any
given procedure supports a primary, secondary or tertiary (exploratory) outcome of the trial protocol. This
evaluation is made by the HAPIN Steering Committee.
Furthermore, we do not factor in specific local regulations into the matrix in an a priori fashion, and thus
leave it to local investigators and study teams to adjust
for these [9]. Because of this, our framework specifications may need to be adjusted to meet local institutional
or government regulations regarding PPE or other safety
practices. Finally, our framework is limited by the
current evidence regarding transmission risk and should
be reevaluated and updated as our understanding grows.
Such updates will require evaluation by scientists who
are up to date on the current literature and recommendations regarding transmission and appropriate PPE, and
must be sensitive to changes in local practices. While
the recently discovered variants of the SARS-COV-2
suggests higher transmission risk, we do not have experimental or observation evidence at this time that our
framework should be significantly changed [10]. However, should evidence emerge that for example, cloth
masks are less protective or residual survival of the virus
on surfaces is greater, we would need to make changes
to our protocols [11].
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Discussion
Our risk assessment framework uses a four-level risk
schedule that is flexible, allowing adjustment for changes
to risk measures and definitions as new evidence
emerges about virus transmission. The approach and
risk assessment tool we present here can be adapted by
other investigators who are assessing and managing the
risk posed in their own research during the coronavirus
pandemic. However, prior to the deployment of risk assessment tools such as ours, researchers, in association
with community members, IRBs, DSMBs, and grant funders need to evaluate the importance of any activity
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Of note, the most relevant existing framework we are
aware of for resumption of research in the COVID-19
pandemic context is that published by Lumeng and colleagues designed for U.S. clinical research. Our framework was developed independently and for a different
context, but their basic approach is similar to ours in
that it provides for a high level set of principles, a tiered
framework, and risk evaluation that includes factors such
as duration and distance of contact between researchers
and patients. Our framework adds a great detail to risk
evaluation in more complex and varied environments,
and outlines how these can apply to specific and diverse
research tasks (See Additional file 1: Tables 1–5). Our
framework also differs from Lumeng et al’s in that we
have not included an explict benefit analysis, as described in the preceding paragraphs.
This risk analysis takes place in the dynamic context
of a global pandemic. We plan to reassess each activity
using our tool at least monthly as more information
about SARS-CoV-2 transmission and the local epidemics
becomes available. While the pandemic has been disruptive to our research, we believe there may also be some
benefits from the shift in some data collection methods.
For example, collecting data via telephone instead of visiting in-person increases time use efficiency for staff and
decreases the burden of household visits on participants.
Costs are lower, with less fuel used to travel via truck or
motorbike to distant participant homes. On the other
hand, telephone surveys may introduce uncertainty, if
questions are complex in nature and may lead to poor
response rates or lower quality data [12]. We acknowledge that we have been able to resume study activities
in some of our research sites, and attribute this to building relationships with participants over the past several
years and the commitment of our local teams and collaborating institutions.
For researchers now facing the need to resume activities that may lead to risk of exposure to staff and participants, we offer the following advice. First, evaluate any
scientific developments about risk of infection or severity of disease that might change the calculus fundamentally. Second, convene representatives of your research
teams, IRB members, relevant patient groups, stakeholders, and infectious disease experts to evaluate research activities against our framework and risk
schedule, and then adapt as necessary with broad input.
Third, while the field, clinical and laboratory activities
we presented (Tables 1-2, Additional file 1) may be similar in scope to other research activities, we have obviously not presented all of the potential scenarios.
Research activities should be adapted to fit individual research needs, reviewed repeatedly by stakeholder groups
until consensus is reached, and operationalized using
Standard Operating Procedures for each activity stream.

Beyond the risk assessment tool we have outlined
above, we offer the following brief description of how we
deployed these rules for field teams that may have similar needs. At the beginning of the pandemic, we temporarily suspended all activities except for LPG fuel delivery
until risk of the measurements could be assessed and
procedures put into place to ensure safety. We continued collecting data by telephone when possible. When
in-person contact was permitted by local authorities and
local institutional IRBs, we used our framework to guide
the appropriate protocols. If designated PPE was not
available or could not be used properly at any time, we
postponed the activity. Similarly, our rules required goggles or face shields for certain procedures, but participants (especially children) may find these terrifying,
especially when combined with masks and gloves. In
these situations, it may not be possible to complete the
work as planned, and local staff had the autonomy and
responsibility to decide whether any activity should
proceed.
Finally, our guidance is based on expert opinion and
has not been empirically verified at this time. Importantly, our framework does not substitute for the need
for coordination and approval of IRBs when protocols
are modified.

Simkovich et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology

Conclusion
We are optimistic that by applying this systematic,
procedure-specific approach to risk assessment for each
research activity, we will minimize the disruption in our
trial due to the pandemic and support the completion of
our primary outcomes. Our framework can be applied to
other field trials in low-resource settings to guide investigators in assessing the risk of each trial activity and
implementing appropriate safety measures, where the
level of risk is acceptable. While no activity in the
current context is completely without risk of infection,
utilizing a systematic approach is the optimal way to
safeguard research activities, protect research staff and
participants, and comply with the ethical obligations to
those that have agreed to participate in trials, along with
the communities and funders that have supported these
efforts.
Abbreviations
SARS-CoV-2: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2; COVID19: Coronavirus disease 2019; PPE: Personal protective equipment; HAPI
N: Household Air Pollution Intervention Network; IRBs: Institutional Review
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